MATERIAL ADVERSE CHANGE CLAUSES IN TENNESSEE:

GENESCO V. FINISH LINE

BRADLEY C. SAGRAVES AND BOBAK TALEBIAN
I. INTRODUCTION
In September 2007, Genesco, Inc. (―Genesco‖) filed the first major material
adverse change (―MAC‖) case with a Tennessee choice of law provision against The
Finish Line, Inc. (―Finish Line‖).1 Genesco, a Nashville-based footwear retailer, filed
suit to enforce the merger agreement it had entered into with Finish Line on June 17,
2007 (the ―Merger Agreement‖).2 At the time the Merger Agreement was signed,
Genesco had received merger offers from The Foot Locker, Inc. and Finish Line.3
Genesco declined offers from The Foot Locker, Inc. of $46 per share4 and $51 per
share5 in anticipation of receiving a higher bid from Finish Line.6
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Complaint for Specific Performance of Obligations Under Agreement and Plan of Merger at 1-2,
Genesco, Inc. v. The Finish Line, Inc., No. 07-2137-II (Tenn. Ch. Ct. filed Sept. 21, 2007), available at
http://www.genesco.com/?g=litigation_library.litigation_library (follow ―01 Complaint Filed by
Genesco‖ hyperlink) [hereinafter Complaint].
1

2

Id. at 1, 3.

3

Id. at 3, 6.

Id. at 6; Press Release, Genesco Inc., Genesco Statement (Apr. 20, 2007), available at
http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=104&STORY=/www/story/08-062007/0004640307&EDATE=.
4

Complaint, supra note 1, at 3, 6; Press Release, Genesco Inc., Genesco Announces Review of
Strategic Alternatives; Company Reports Receipt and Rejection of Acquisition Proposal at $51 Per
Share
(May
31,
2007),
available
at
http://www.prnewswire.com/cgibin/stories.pl?ACCT=104&STORY=/www/story/05-31-2007/0004598837&EDATE=.
5

6

Complaint, supra note 1, at 6.
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On June 18, 2007, Finish Line and Genesco announced the execution of the
Merger Agreement under which Genesco would merge into a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Finish Line in exchange for ―$54.50 in cash per outstanding share of
Genesco common stock.‖7 Finish Line was the smaller company in terms of
revenue generation and operations; therefore, it chose to pursue a highly leveraged
transaction, using senior secured credit facilities and unsecured senior notes to
finance the merger.8 Contemporaneously, Finish Line and its financial backers, UBS
Securities LLC and UBS Loan Finance LLC (collectively ―UBS‖), executed a
commitment letter (the ―Commitment Letter‖) providing the $1.84 billion required
to accomplish the transaction.9 The Merger Agreement and Commitment Letter
included identical MAC clauses.10 Significantly, the Merger Agreement was governed
by Tennessee law; whereas, the Commitment Letter was governed by New York
law.11 Following execution of the Merger Agreement, both parties continued their
due diligence and proceeded to meet the conditions precedent to closing the
merger.12
On August 30, 2007, Genesco announced that its second quarter earnings
had fallen below expectations and reported a $0.13 loss per share for the second

Id. at 3; Press Release, Genesco, Inc., Finish Line to Acquire Genesco Creating Leading $2.8 Billion
Retailer
(June
18,
2007),
available
at
http://phx.corporateir.net/preview/phoenix.zhtml?c=75042&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1016370&highlight=;
see
also
Genesco Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), Ex. 2.1, at 3 (Jun. 18, 2007), available at
http://phx.corporateir.net/preview/phoenix.zhtml?c=75042&p=irolsec&secCat01.1_rs=71&secCat01.1_rc=10
(follow
―6/18/07 8-K‖ hyperlink) [hereinafter Merger Agreement].
7

8

Complaint, supra note 1, at 14.

Id.; Defendants‘ Answer, Counterclaim, and Third-Party Claim for Declaratory Relief at 19-20,
Genesco Inc. v. The Finish Line, Inc., No. 07-2137-II (Tenn. Ch. Ct. filed Sept. 28, 2007), available at
http://www.genesco.com/?g=litigation_library.litigation_library (follow ―10 Finish Line Answer
Counterclaim and 3rd Party Calim for Declatory Relief‖ hyperlink) [hereinafter Answer].
9

10

Answer, supra note 9, at 21.

Posting
of
Paul
M.
Bush
to
M
&
A
Law
Prof
Blog,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/mergers/2007/09/genesco-bring-i.html (Sept. 24, 2007, 13:03
EST).
11

12

See Complaint, supra note 1, at 13.
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quarter.13 The loss was ―the largest dollar decline in operating income in 10 years‖
for Genesco.14 In response to the decline and in light of its recent write-down of
over $10 billion in sub-prime mortgage debt, UBS began to reevaluate its
commitment to the merger.15 UBS sent letters to Finish Line on September 11 and
13, 2007, questioning whether Genesco had suffered a MAC.16 UBS requested
updated financial data to determine whether Genesco had experienced a MAC.17
Genesco viewed the request as more than a delay tactic and feared that UBS ―was
attempting to renege on its commitments.‖18 As such, Genesco filed suit in the
Chancery Court for Davidson County, Tennessee, as provided in the choice of
forum provision of the Merger Agreement.19
In its complaint, Genesco alleged that Finish Line breached the contract for
numerous reasons and sought specific performance of the Merger Agreement.20
However, ―[f]rom the outset of the lawsuit, all parties recognized that a ruling on
whether a MAC had occurred was determinative of Genesco‘s claim of specific
performance and Finish Line‘s and UBS‘s defense to that claim.‖21 The Tennessee
trial court issued a Memorandum and Order finding that a MAC had occurred; but
Genesco Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 5 (Aug. 30, 2007), available at http://phx.corporateir.net/preview/phoenix.zhtml?c=75042&p=irol-sec&secCat01.1_rs=61&secCat01.1_rc=10 (follow
―6/18/07 8-K‖ hyperlink; then follow ―Page 3 – Subdocument 2 – EX-99.1).
13

Memorandum and Order at 13, Genesco Inc. v. The Finish Line, Inc., No. 07-2137-II(III) (Tenn.
Ch.
Ct.
filed
Dec.
27,
2007),
available
at
http://www.genesco.com/?g=litigation_library.litigation_library (follow ―57 Memorandum and
Order‖ hyperlink) [hereinafter Decision].
14

Answer, supra note 9, at 22; Update 1-Finish Line Says UBS Concerned about Genesco, REUTERS, Sept. 14,
2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/mergersnew/idusn1422920320070914.
15

16

Answer, supra note 9, at 22.

17

Id.

18

Complaint, supra note 1, at 20.

19

Id. at 1, 2.

20

Id. at 29-33.

Memorandum and Order at 3, Genesco Inc. v. The Finish Line, Inc., No. 07-2137-II(III) (Tenn.
Ch.
Ct.
filed
Nov.
29,
2007)
available
at
http://www.genesco.com/?g=litigation_library.litigation_library (follow ―51 Memorandum and
Order‖ hyperlink) [hereinafter Pretrial Order].
21
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the court also held that Genesco fell within the carve-out exception and was entitled
to specific performance.22 The court also issued a Supplemental Order clarifying that
the Memorandum and Order was not a final order because the issue of insolvency
would be tried by the New York courts and would affect the finality of the decision
in the Tennessee lawsuit.23 Prior to the New York trial and before the Tennessee
court could issue a final decision, Genesco, Finish Line, and UBS settled their
dispute.24
Even though the parties settled their dispute prior to final adjudication, the
Tennessee court‘s handling of the MAC claim and its remarks in evaluating the MAC
clause provide insight for attorneys on drafting merger agreements and MAC clauses
governed by Tennessee law. Part II addresses MAC clauses generally and particularly
in light of Delaware‘s Tyson case. Part III analyzes the MAC provision that was at
issue in Genesco‘s Merger Agreement and Commitment Letter. This part describes
not only the factors that led to the occurrence of a MAC, but also the carve-out
exceptions and the remedy of specific performance. Part IV provides a brief analysis
of the impact of Genesco on the current state of law. Finally, Part V offers a brief
conclusion about the precedential effect of Genesco and describes its significance for
attorneys practicing in Tennessee.
II. MAC CLAUSES GENERALLY
A. Overall Considerations
MAC clauses25 may be found in various types of contracts but are almost
always used as closing conditions in merger and acquisition agreements.26 The
22

See infra notes 130, 139, 143 and accompanying text.

23

See infra notes 151-55, and accompanying text.

24

See infra notes 156-62, and accompanying text.

MAC clauses may also be referred to as material adverse effect (―MAE‖) clauses. Jonathon M.
Grech, Comment: “Opting Out”: Defining the Material Adverse Change Clause in a Volatile Economy, 52
EMORY L.J. 1483, 1484 n.10 (2003) (using MAC and MAE interchangeably throughout the
Comment); Kari K. Hall, How Big is the Mac?: Material Adverse Change Clauses in Today’s Acquisition
Environment, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1062 (2003) (stating that ―a material adverse change (MAC)
clause [is] also called [a] material adverse effect (MAE) clause‖). But see Kenneth A. Adams, A LegalUsage Analysis of “Material Adverse Change” Provisions, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 9, 17-20 (2004)
(arguing that the use of MAC is preferable to the use of MAE); Jordan A. Goldstein, The Efficiency of
Specific Performance in Stock-for-Stock Mergers, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 747, 749 n.5 (2004) (stating that
―[a]lthough the difference between an MAE and a MAC is generally cosmetic . . . an MAE clause
arguably sweeps broader than a MAC‖); Alana A. Zerbe, The Material Adverse Effect Provision: Multiple
25
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inclusion of MAC clauses serve to ―protect the parties from changes in
circumstances that may occur between the time of directorial approval of the
agreement and consummation of the transaction.‖27 MAC clauses protect the
acquiring company by allowing it to withdraw from (or renegotiate) the transaction
without being liable for breach when an event causing a MAC in the target company
has occurred.28 MAC clauses also protect the target company by restricting the
reasons for which an acquiring company may terminate a merger agreement without
being liable for a breach of contract.29 Accordingly, MAC clauses are essential to
merger agreements and ―are usually the products of intense negotiation . . . .‖30
Given the nature of MAC clauses, they are generally thought of as a method
of allocating risk between the target and acquiror for the interim between the signing
of the agreement and the closing of the deal.31 In negotiating the construction of the
clause, the acquiring company and the target company have very different objectives.
The acquiring company will draft a broad provision that allows maximum freedom
to terminate or renegotiate the deal.32 On the other hand, the target company will
fight for a narrow provision that ―ensure[s] that the deal goes forward—no matter
what.‖33 The target company may be able to restrict the applicability of the provision
by narrowly defining the term ―material‖ or by including several carve-out

Interpretations & Surprising Remedies, 22 U. PITT. J.L. & COM. 17, 17 n.1 (2002) (noting a distinction
between an MAC and an MAE but conceding that the two are often used interchangeably in practice).
In this article, the terms MAC and MAE are used synonymously.
26

Grech, supra note 25, at 1484.

Celia R. Taylor, When Good Mergers Go Bad: Controlling Corporate Managers Who Suffer a Change of Heart,
37 U. RICH. L. REV. 577, 586 (2003); see also Hall, supra note 25, at 1062.
27

28

Taylor, supra note 27, at 586-87.

29

Id. at 587-88.

30

Id. at 587.

Yair Y. Galil, MAC Clauses in a Materially Adversely Changed Economy, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 846,
848 (2002); Sherri L. Toub, Note, “Buyer’s Regret” No Longer: Drafting Effective MAC Clauses in a PostIBP Environment, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 849, 853-54 (2003).
31

32

Hall, supra note 25, at 1064; Taylor, supra note 27, at 588; Toub, supra note 31, at 854.

33

Toub, supra note 31, at 854; see also Hall, supra note 25, at 1064; Taylor, supra note 27, at 587-88.
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exceptions.34 By drafting a narrow definition of ―material‖ or providing specific
carve-out exceptions as to what will not be considered a MAC, the target company
may limit the acquiring company‘s ability to invoke the MAC clause as a method of
terminating the agreement.35 For example, the provision may state that a fifty
percent or greater loss in earnings constitutes a MAC. Under this MAC clause, the
acquiror may fail to close and terminate the merger agreement without liability if the
target company experiences a loss of fifty percent of its earnings prior to closing.
Despite the benefits of specifically defining materiality for purposes of a
MAC clause, most merger agreements use a vague definition of materiality with large
carve-out provisions, leaving the determination of what constitutes a MAC to the
courts.36 Courts interpreting a broad MAC clause tend to use a fact-intensive
analysis.37 Because courts evaluate the facts in the context of each case, establishing
a strict quantitative standard for determining materiality is impossible absent a clear,
express, and exclusive definition of materiality in the agreement.38 Although other
areas of law have defined materiality, those definitions fail to provide definitive
guidance when interpreting MAC clauses.39 The 2001 Delaware Chancery Court case
See Hall, supra note 25, at 1064; Taylor, supra note 27, at 588; Toub, supra note 31, at 895-901; see also
Richard E. Climan et al., Negotiating Acquisitions of Public Companies, 10 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 219, 23740 (2002) (discussing carve-outs). Carve-outs are specific circumstances that the drafter lists as not
constituting a MAC. Toub, supra note 31, at 900-01.
34

35

Hall, supra note 25, at 1063-64.

36

See Hall, supra note 25, at 1064.

Jeffrey T. Cicarella, Note, Wake of Death: How the Current MAC Standard Circumvents the Purpose of the
MAC Clause, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 423, 430 (2007).
37

38

Id.

Id. at 431. For example, the SEC has a clear definition of what is material in certain contexts. E.g.,
17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2008) (―The term material, when used to qualify a requirement for the furnishing
of information as to any subject, limits the information required to those matters to which there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would attach importance in determining whether to
purchase the security registered.‖); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2008) (―The term ―material,‖ when used to
qualify a requirement for the furnishing of information as to any subject, limits the information
required to those matters to which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would
attach importance in determining whether to buy or sell the securities registered.‖). Additionally, the
United States Supreme Court has held that determining materiality under SEC Rule 10b-5 ―requires
delicate assessments of the inferences a ‗reasonable shareholder‘ would draw from a given set of facts
and the significance of those inferences to him . . . .‖ Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988)
(citing TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976)). The same ―reasonableness‖
test has been applied to defining materiality as to one‘s fiduciary duty of care. See Jordan v. Fed.
Express Corp., 116 F.3d 1005, 1016 n.18 (3d Cir. 1997). However, these definitions should not be
39
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of IBP, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc.40 (―Tyson‖) is the seminal case upon which most
jurisdictions rely when interpreting MAC clauses.41 While Tennessee is a Model
Business Corporation Act jurisdiction,42 the chancery court in Genesco relied heavily
on the Delaware authority provided in Tyson.43
B. Tyson and Delaware Law
Delaware Chancery Court‘s landmark opinion in Tyson was the first
significant decision to ―focus[] almost entirely on the interpretation of MAC clauses
in merger agreements.‖44 The controversy in Tyson arose from a merger agreement
between Tyson, ―the nation‘s leading chicken distributor,‖ and IBP, ―the nation‘s
number one beef and number two pork distributor.‖45 Tyson acquired IBP in an
auction for $30 per share in cash, stock, or a combination of cash and stock. 46 Tyson
pursued this deal despite having ―a great deal of information‖ that suggested IBP
faced financial difficulty.47 During the auction, Tyson learned that DFG, a subsidiary
of IBP, ―had been victimized by accounting fraud . . . and . . . was the active subject
applied to a MAC clause, because investors in securities and acquirors of businesses may have
different criteria for determining whether something is material. Cicarella, supra note 31, at 431; see
also Adams, supra note 37, at 23-24.
40

IBP, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001).

41

Cicarella, supra note 37, at 432.

See Kradel v. Piper Indus., Inc., 60 S.W.3d 744, 749 (Tenn. 2001) (explaining that the Tennessee
Business Corporation Act ―was patterned in large part after the Revised Model Business Corporation
Act of 1984‖).
42

Decision, supra note 14, at 34. The chancery court‘s reliance on Delaware authority is not
unprecedented as Tennessee courts have often looked to Delaware corporation law for guidance
when the Tennessee Business Corporation Act and the Revised Model Business Corporation Act are
not helpful. See McCarthy v. Middle Tenn. Elec. Membership Corp., 466 F.3d 399, 409 (6th Cir.
2006) (stating that ―Delaware‘s judiciary are recognized as specialists in the field of corporate law.
Courts of other states consider the decisions of Delaware courts on corporate matters to be
instructive‖).
43

44

Toub, supra note 31, at 871.

45

IBP, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 789 A.2d 14, 21 (Del. Ch. 2001).

46

Id. at 21-22, 40.

47

Id. at 22.
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of an asset impairment study.‖48 After signing the merger agreement, Tyson
presented the merger to its stockholders and argued that IBP was a valuable
acquisition despite ―the cyclical nature of IBP‘s business.‖ 49 Persuaded by these
arguments, Tyson‘s stockholders ratified the merger agreement and authorized
management to take the necessary steps to effectuate the merger.50
During the winter and spring following the stockholders‘ approval of the
merger, both Tyson and IBP experienced poor earnings performances.51 The
problems at both companies were primarily due to a severe winter that adversely
affected livestock.52 In addition, an accounting fraud was discovered at DFG, and
Tyson was informed that the subsidiary faced impairment charges.53 Experiencing
―buyer‘s regret,‖ Tyson delayed and lost interest in pursuing the merger.54 In March
2001, Don Tyson, Tyson‘s founder and controlling stockholder, abandoned the
merger.55
After deciding to renounce the merger, Tyson‘s legal team promptly sent a
letter to IBP terminating the agreement.56 In addition, Tyson sued IBP for
fraudulently inducing the merger.57
In response, IBP moved for specific
performance of the merger agreement.58 Tyson argued that it had the right to
terminate the agreement because ―the DFG Impairment Charge as well as IBP‘s

48

Id.

49

Id.

50

Id.

51

Id.

52

Id.

53

Id. at 37.

54

Id. at 22.

55

Id. at 22-23.

56

Id. at 23.

57

Id.

58

Id.

350

2008]

MATERIAL ADVERSE CHANGE CLAUSES IN TENNESSEE

351

disappointing first quarter 2001 performance [were] evidence of a Material Adverse
Effect.‖59
In assessing the MAC claims, the Delaware Chancery Court used general
principles of contract law to guide its decision.60 Specifically, the court applied New
York law as provided in the choice of law provision in the merger agreement.61 Using
New York contract law, the court attempted to interpret the parties‘ expressions by
considering their reasonable expectations at the time they entered into the
agreement.62 To accomplish this, the court examined the MAC clause in light of the
entire merger agreement.63 If the agreement was ambiguous as to the parties‘
intentions, then the court would examine extrinsic evidence of communications
between the parties to resolve the ambiguity.64
Initially, the Tyson Court examined the definition of MAC provided in the
merger agreement.65 The merger agreement provided, in relevant part, that
a material adverse effect (or ―MAE‖) is defined as ‗any event,
occurrence or development of a state of circumstances or
facts which has had or reasonably could be expected to have
a Material Adverse Effect‘ . . . ‗on the condition (financial or

Id. at 52. Tyson also asserted that IBP breached its contractual representations and that the
agreement was fraudulently induced. Id. However, these arguments are not pertinent to the
discussion in this article. Also, the Tyson opinion uses MAC and MAE interchangeably. See supra note
25 and accompanying text.
59

60

See Taylor, supra note 27, at 580-81.

Tyson Foods, Inc., 789 A.2d at 52. While Tyson applies New York contract law in analyzing a MAC
clause, the Delaware Chancery Court later adopted the Tyson Court‘s reasoning for use in cases
construed under Delaware contract law. See, e.g., Great Lakes Chem. Corp. v. Pharmacia Corp., 788
A.2d 544, 557 (Del. Ch. 2001).
61

62

Tyson Foods, Inc., 789 A.2d at 55.

63

Id.

64

Id.

65

Id. at 65.
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otherwise), business, assets, liabilities or results of operation
of [IBP] and [its] Subsidiaries taken as a whole . . . .‘66
Given the breadth of the definition, the court found the interpretation of the
provision to be a ―dauntingly complex‖ task.67 To determine the scope of the MAC
clause, the court used an objective standard to define materiality and employed a
reference point of ―a reasonable investor or acquiror having the same total mix of
information that Tyson possessed.‖68 The court also considered IBP‘s argument that
the MAC clause contained an implicit carve-out exception for swings in livestock
supply.69 IBP argued that the parties derived the carve-out exception from the
financial statements IBP submitted with the merger agreement expressing the
business‘s cyclical nature.70 Despite IBP‘s assertions, the court was not persuaded by
this argument and refused to read implicit provisions into the MAC clause.71 The
court stated that ―[h]ad IBP wished such an exclusion from the broad language of
[the MAC clause], IBP should have bargained for it.‖72 Thus, the express terms of
the negotiated merger agreement were respected by the court in its determination of
whether a MAC occurred.73
Three important points must be emphasized from the court‘s statements.
First, in considering the MAC clause in light of the agreement as a whole, the court
narrowly interpreted the MAC clause in favor of IBP, the target.74 Second, in
interpreting the parties‘ intentions, the court was reluctant to read any implicit
provisions into the MAC clause that were not explicitly bargained for by the parties.75
66

Id.

67

Id.

68

Id. at 63.

69

Id. at 66.

70

Id.

71

Id.

72

Id.

73

Id.

74

Id. at 54-55, 66.

75

Id. at 66.
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Third, the court recognized that this MAC provision allowed for factors outside of
IBP‘s control that affected IBP‘s business to be considered a MAC.76 Despite its
willingness to consider external factors, the court was not persuaded by Tyson‘s
assertion that it had a right to terminate the merger agreement solely because of the
downturn in cattle supply.77 To invoke the MAC clause, Tyson had to prove the
downturn in cattle supply was material.78
The Tyson Court looked disfavorably upon the fact that Tyson did not claim a
MAC when it initially terminated the merger agreement.79 The court found that this
delay suggested two things: (1) that Tyson did not consider IBP‘s short term slump
to be a MAC80 and (2) that Tyson‘s assertion that a MAC occurred was a post-hoc
argument prepared in hindsight to justify a course of action.81 The court also noted
that Tyson knew of IBP‘s cyclical nature during its negotiations with IBP. 82 In fact,
prior to the execution and delivery of the merger agreement, Tyson knew of a
projected decrease in cattle supply that would adversely affect profitability until 2004,
three years after the merger.83 The court stated that ―[t]hese negotiating realities bear
on the interpretation of [the MAC clause] and suggest that the contractual language
must be read in the larger context in which the parties were transacting.‖84 As a
result of the information provided to Tyson during the negotiation process, it was
obvious to the court that Tyson was interested in a long-term strategy rather than
short-term profitability.85 Based on the nature of Tyson‘s interest in IBP and New
York case law indicating that buyers must have a strong case to invoke a MAC claim,
76

Id.

77

Id.

78

Id.

79

Id. at 65.

80

Id.

81

Id.

82

Id. at 67.

83

Id.

84

Id.

85

Id.
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thereby placing the burden on the acquiror,86 the court found that IBP did not
experience a MAC.87
The Tyson Court held that ―even where a Material Adverse Effect condition
is as broadly written as the one in [this] Merger Agreement, that provision is best
read as a backstop protecting the acquiror from the occurrence of unknown events
that substantially threaten the overall earnings potential of the target in a
durationally-significant manner.‖88 Therefore, ―[a] short-term hiccup in earnings
should not suffice; rather the Material Adverse Effect should be material when
viewed from the longer-term perspective of a reasonable acquiror.‖89
The court‘s definition of the materiality standard in Tyson—a facially
objective standard focused on the reasonable acquiror90—represents an important
step in interpreting MAC clauses. However, two reasonable acquirors may have
different perspectives. The Tyson Court‘s use of a contextual analysis in applying this
standard91 is also significant. Because companies will often consider the long-term
outcomes of the merger and the reasonable expectations credited by the court will be
those of a long-term investor, the amount of time over which the complainant must
show a material adverse effect or change will be increased. Accordingly, Tyson sets a
very ―target-friendly‖ standard to be applied when interpreting broadly drafted MAC
provisions.
In addition to concluding that Tyson was unable to invoke the MAC clause
to terminate the IBP merger, the court considered the potential remedy of specific
performance.92 Consistent with its MAC analysis, the court used New York law to
determine the proper remedy.93 Under both New York and Delaware law, the target
86

Id. at 68.

87

Id. at 71.

88

Id. at 68.

89

Id.

90

Id.

91

Id. at 67.

92

Id. at 82.

93

Id. at 53.
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has the burden of persuasion in proving entitlement to specific performance in an
action for breach of a merger agreement by an acquiror.94 In New York, the burden
of proof is by a preponderance of evidence,95 whereas, in most states, including
Delaware, the burden of proof is clear and convincing evidence.96 This distinction is
particularly important in Tyson given the court‘s uncomfortable admission that it
reached its conclusion ―with less than the optimal amount of confidence.‖97
Additionally, the court stated that IBP met the preponderance of evidence standard
of proof, and even if the court incorrectly decided the proper burden to apply, the
evidence met the clear and convincing standard.98 The Genesco Court adopted this
style of reasoning.
III. GENESCO’S MAC CLAUSE
In Genesco, the Merger Agreement used the term ―Company Material Adverse
Effect‖ (―MAE‖), defined in Section 3.1(a) to ―mean any event, circumstance,
change or effect that, individually or in the aggregate, is materially adverse to the
business, condition (financial or otherwise), assets, liabilities or results of operations
of the Company and the Company Subsidiaries, taken as a whole . . . .‖99 As in Tyson,
the parties in Genesco used the terms MAC and MAE interchangeably.100 The Merger
Agreement did not define ―material‖ in the context of a MAC or in any other
context.101 However, the court interpreted the words ―material,‖ ―adverse,‖ and ―as
a whole‖ to require that ―the change in the target company‘s business . . . be
Id. at 52. The court states that in order to succeed in plea for specific performance ―[u]nder New
York law, IBP must show that: (1) the Merger Agreement is a valid contract between the parties; (2)
IBP has substantially performed under the contract and is willing and able to perform its remaining
obligations; (3) Tyson is able to perform its obligations; and (4) IBP has no adequate remedy at law.‖
Id.
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significant‖ to constitute a MAC.102 The court further required that ―[c]ommon
sense considerations such as [1] the duration of the change, [2] the measure of the
change and [3] whether the change relates to an essential purpose or purposes the
parties sought to achieve by entering into the merger‖ be used to determine whether
a MAC has occurred.103 Similar to the court‘s approach in Tyson, the Genesco Court
stated that these decisions must be made in ―reference to the context and
circumstances of the merger.‖104
In evaluating whether the MAC clause was triggered, the court reviewed
whether the adverse changes asserted by Finish Line were specifically excluded under
the carve-out provisions before discussing whether a MAC actually occurred.105
Commentators have noted that this order of reasoning seems backwards.106 The
remainder of this Part will first discuss the court‘s determination of whether a MAC
occurred and then discuss the applicability of the carve-out provisions in the MAC.
A. Occurrence of a MAC
To determine whether a MAC occurred, the Genesco Court considered the
length of time over which the adverse effects alleged by Finish Line endured to
determine if the effects were material.107 In arguing whether the duration of the
effects was significant, both parties ―latched onto‖ the Delaware court‘s statement
―in Tyson that a ‗blip‘ in earnings does not constitute a[] MAE.‖108 Rather than
following the lead of the parties, the court opted to focus on the express language of
Section 7.2(b) of the Merger Agreement.109 This provision stated that ―[s]ince the
date of this Agreement, there shall not have occurred a Company Material Adverse
102

Decision, supra note 14, at 34.

103

Id.

104

Id.

105

Id. at 29-37.

Genesco
v.
Finish
Line:
The
Opinion,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/mergers/2007/12/genesco-the-opi.html (Dec. 28, 2007).
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107

Decision, supra note 14, at 35-36.

108

Id. at 35.

109

Id.
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Effect with respect to the Company and the Company Subsidiaries, considered as a
whole, that has not been cured prior to the Termination Date.‖110 The Genesco Court
viewed this ―drop dead‖ date termination provision as ―an acknowledgement by the
parties that in the context of this merger a[] MAE can occur in three or four
months.‖111
The court reasoned that, if a MAE can occur in as little as three or four
months, then the combination of lower second and third-quarter earnings was an
adverse effect of significant duration.112 The Tyson Court stated that ―[a] short-term
hiccup in earnings should not suffice; rather the [MAE] should be material when
viewed form the longer-term perspective of a reasonable acquiror.‖113 The Tyson
merger agreement was signed on January 1, 2001 but referred to MAC events that
occurred after December 25, 1999.114 Thus, the length of time required for a MAC
to have occurred was significantly shorter in Genesco than in Tyson.
The Genesco Court also considered whether the change was large enough to
be considered material.115 In concluding that the identified changes were
quantitatively significant, the court stated that there was ―no offset or mitigation of
the [second quarter] and [third quarter] declines to remove 2007 as one of the lowest
earnings in [ten] years.‖116 Failure to meet published projections was specifically
excluded as a MAC in the Merger Agreement;117 however, the Merger Agreement
provided that the facts and circumstances underlying the missed projections could be
used to determine if a MAC has occurred.118
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Id. (emphasis omitted).
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Id.
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Id. at 35-36.
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In February 2007, Genesco missed its projections by $1.7 million.119 In May
2007, Genesco missed its projections by $2.1 million.120 In June 2007, it missed its
projections by $4.7 million.121 During the third quarter, Genesco again missed its
projections by $10 million.122 During May 2006, Genesco returned poor earnings but
recovered in the fourth quarter to have a profitable year.123 Although Genesco‘s
annual earnings increased above the May 2007 projections, the increase failed to
offset the second quarter losses.124 Because the drastic deviation of actual earnings
from Genesco‘s projections greatly reduced the company‘s net income, the court
determined that the change in earnings was significant.125
The last factor the court reviewed was whether the MAE affected an
essential purpose sought by the parties in the merger.126 The court found that Finish
Line‘s principal goals in consummating the merger were threefold: (1) to diversify
the company, (2) to recognize synergies from reduced costs, and (3) to provide
growth opportunities.127 The court stated that if the merger was completed,
Genesco‘s decreased earnings would not affect the goals of diversification and
synergies.128 However, Finish Line intended to finance the deal entirely with debt
with up to 70% of the debt payments being paid from Genesco‘s operating revenue
after the merger was completed.129 The court took into account the fact that
―Genesco‘s decline in earnings affect[ed] the ability of the merged entity to pay its
119

Decision, supra note 14, at 10.
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financing and have money left over to grow the company.‖130 The court concluded
that the ability of the merged company to grow was an essential purpose of the
transaction to Finish Line and that Genesco‘s decreased earnings materially and
adversely changed that outcome.131 Thus, without giving effect to the express
contractual exceptions, the court determined that Genesco suffered a MAE.132
B. Carve-Out Exceptions
In determining whether a MAE provision is triggered, the court must review
the carve-outs negotiated by the parties.133 The Merger Agreement provided that the
following does not constitute a MAE:
. . . (B) changes in the national or world economy or financial
markets as a whole or changes in general economic conditions that
affect the industries in which the Company and the Company
Subsidiaries conduct their business, so long as such changes or
conditions do not adversely affect the Company and the Company
Subsidiaries, taken as a whole, in a materially disproportionate
manner relative to other similarly situated participants in the
industries or markets in which they operate; . . . (D) the failure, in and
of itself, of the Company to meet any published or internally
prepared estimates of revenues, earnings or other financial
projections, performance measures or operating statistics; provided,
however, that the facts and circumstances underlying any such failure
may, except as may be provided in subsection (A), (B), (C), (E),
(F) and (G) of this definition, be considered in determining whether a
Company Material Adverse Effect has occurred; . . . and (G) acts or
omissions of Parent or Merger Sub after the date of this Agreement
(other than actions or omissions specifically contemplated by this
Agreement).134

130

Id. at 37.
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Id. at 33, 37.
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Id. at 29-31.
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To determine whether any of these carve-outs apply to the adverse effects
documented by Finish Line, the court weighed the testimony presented at trial
concerning the cause of Genesco‘s lost profits.135 Experts from each side gave
testimony regarding both general conditions and industry-specific conditions.136 The
court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Genesco‘s performance in 2007
was ―due to general economic conditions such as higher gasoline, heating oil and
food prices, housing and mortgage issues, and increased consumer debt loads.‖137
The court‘s reliance on in-court testimony was consistent with the facts and
circumstances approach used in Tyson.138 The court gave substantial weight to the
testimony of Duane Cantrell, former president and director of Payless Shoe Stores. 139
The court cited ―Mr. Cantrell‘s retail experience . . . as well as the breadth of the
sources he identifies‖ as the most persuasive testimony in finding that Genesco‘s
decreased revenues were due to general economic conditions.140
The defined MAE carves-out a change in general economic conditions that
materially affects the company; therefore, the Merger Agreement exempted this
MAE from coverage under the closing condition.141 Accordingly, the Genesco Court
held that Finish Line‘s actions in failing to consummate the merger breached the
Merger Agreement and, pending a decision on the solvency of the merged entity by a
New York court, Finish Line was required to merge with Genesco.142
C. Specific Performance
Rather than applying the specific performance provision in the Merger
Agreement, the Genesco Court applied Tennessee law to determine whether specific

135

Decision, supra note 14, at 31-33.
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Id. at 31-32.
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Id. at 31.
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performance was a proper remedy for Finish Line‘s breach.143 This reliance on state
law is similar to the Tyson Court‘s reliance on New York law to decide whether
specific performance was appropriate.144 Ultimately, the court ruled in favor of
Genesco and granted specific performance to remedy the harm caused by the delay
of the merger.145
Tennessee law allows specific performance to be granted if there is no
adequate remedy at law, no suspicion of fraud, and enforcing specific performance
will not be ―harsh, inequitable, or oppressive.‖146 After evaluating these factors, the
Genesco Court found that Genesco could be granted specific performance.147 The
court held that the ―facts proven at trial establish irreparable harm and that the
payment of damages is not an adequate remedy.‖148 The court also found ―as a
matter of law[,] that Genesco did not commit fraud‖ because Genesco had no
affirmative duty to release documents to Finish Line unless Finish Line requested
these documents.149
In addressing whether the specific performance would be harsh, inequitable,
or oppressive, the court determined that specific performance would be oppressive if
the resulting company was insolvent and could not continue with its business
practice.150 Evidence of solvency was carved out of the trial and reserved for a
lawsuit filed by UBS in New York on the Commitment Letter.151 Thus, the
Chancellor ordered specific performance but recognized that a determination by the

143
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New York court that the merger would result in an insolvent entity would halt the
merger.152
Proof of insolvency was not presented to the court because it was an issue
for New York law under the choice of law provision in the Commitment Letter;
therefore, the Tennessee court withheld judgment regarding the solvency of the
merged entity.153 A determination of insolvency by the New York court could have
precluded the merger in spite of the Tennessee court‘s order that the merger must go
forward.154 Because this aspect of the decision was somewhat unclear, a few days
after the issuance of the court‘s Memorandum and Order, the court issued a
Supplemental Order stating that the court‘s order was not a final opinion and would
not be final until the litigation in New York was complete.155
The Supplemental Order reiterated the fact that the insolvency of a
combined Genesco-Finish Line could make Finish Line‘s performance under the
Merger Agreement impossible.156 Such a finding would force Finish Line to return
to the Tennessee courts to argue that the commercial purpose of the Merger
Agreement was frustrated and that Finish Line‘s performance under the Merger
Agreement was excused.157
D. Settlement
On March 4, 2008, Genesco, UBS, and Finish Line settled their disputes out
of court before beginning the solvency trial in New York.158 In their settlement
152

Id.
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Id. at 42.

Id. at 42; Order at 2, Genesco Inc. v. The Finish Line, Inc., No. 07-2137-II(III) (Tenn. Ch. Ct. filed
Jan. 2, 2008), available at http://www.genesco.com/?g=litigation_library.litigation_library (follow ―58
Order‖ hyperlink) [hereinafter Supplemental Order].
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156

Id. at 2.
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Genesco Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), Exhibit 10.1, at 2 (Mar. 4, 2008), available at
http://phx.corporate-ir.net/preview/phoenix.zhtml?c=75042&p=irolsec&secCat01.1_rs=11&secCat01.1_rc=10 (follow ―3/4/08 8-K‖ hyperlink) [hereinafter Settlement
Agreement].
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agreement, Finish Line and UBS agreed to pay Genesco $175 million and to
distribute twelve percent of the shares of Finish Line stock to Genesco‘s
shareholders.159 The parties agreed to settle all outstanding litigation, and Finish Line
and Genesco instituted a standstill agreement forbidding either party from acquiring
ownership interest in the other party, combining with the other company, or
influencing the control or management of the other party.160 The settlement
agreement also included a release of all claims against Finish Line, Genesco, and
UBS.161
At least one commentator has speculated that the pretrial deposition of the
controller for Finish Line—showing that the merged entity would not be solvent—
propelled the parties to settle.162 The commentator stated that, had the New York
court found the merged entity insolvent, UBS would have been released from the
financing obligation and Genesco and Finish Line would have returned to
Tennessee, where the judge would have been compelled to fashion some
unpredictable solution.163 These prospects, or the prohibitive legal fees, could have
induced the parties to settle.164
IV. IMPACT OF GENESCO
The precedential weight of the Genesco decision may be limited beyond the
fact that it is not a final decision.165 Specifically, it may be limited by the express
language of the Merger Agreement relied upon by the court in determining whether a
MAC had occurred. In Tyson, the court viewed materiality ―from the longer-term
perspective of a reasonable acquirer‖166 because the definition of ―material‖ was
159
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vague and extrinsic evidence was admitted to determine what constituted material. 167
In comparison to Tyson, the Genesco Court relied on language in the Merger
Agreement that allowed a MAC to be cured within approximately six months of the
date of the Merger Agreement.168 The court found that this contractual language
served as an implicit recognition by the parties that a MAC could occur during such
a short period.169
The Genesco Court‘s finding that a MAC occurred in such a short period of
time contradicts the Tyson decision. However, this contradiction rests squarely on
the language of the MAC provision. Both courts focused on an intense examination
of the parties‘ intentions and gave great deference to the language of the negotiated
merger agreements. Because repaying the debt out of Genesco‘s profits was a
material purpose of the merger, the court reasoned that the intentions and
expectations of the parties contained a shorter-term view and concluded that the
decline in Genesco‘s earnings constituted a MAC.170 This result is contrary to Tyson
in which the court held that the parties entered into the merger with long-term
intentions and predicted decreased profits in the near future, thereby leading the
court to conclude that short-term losses did not constitute a MAC.171
Genesco‘s precedential effect could also be limited because its result relies on
an express exception within the MAC definition.172 The overall MAC clause was
drafted broadly and specifically included many things often regarded as MACs.173
However, the drafting and negotiation decisions in the Genesco-Finish Line
agreement to exclude a large number of occurrences that normally constitute a MAC
significantly limit the power of the particular MAC clause.
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The importance of the Genesco decision may be its lessons for future drafters
who must focus on drafting MAC exclusions that either minimize or maximize the
number and kind of events that may be considered a MAC. Under Genesco, these
exclusions may narrow the scope of materiality or the changes or effects that permit
termination without constituting a breach of the agreement.
Given the Genesco Court‘s reliance on the ―drop dead‖ date termination
provision in the Merger Agreement, a question arises as to whether a subsequent
drafter could avoid the Genesco result in a merger governed by Tennessee law by
removing or rewriting the ―drop dead‖ date termination provision. It is unclear
whether, and if so, under what circumstances, a Tennessee court would view the
length of time in which a MAC can occur under a more long-term view, as used in
Tyson, as opposed to the shorter-term contract-based view used in Genesco.
V. CONCLUSION
While it is too early to foretell the effects of the Genesco holding on the
interpretation of MAC provisions in Tennessee, much can be learned from this
decision. Both the Genesco Court and the Tyson Court used a very fact- and
document-based review of the parties‘ intentions to determine whether an event was
material in the context of the merger. In Tyson, the issue of specific performance was
heavily litigated, while in Genesco specific performance was specifically provided for in
the Merger Agreement. While Tyson focused on the intention of the parties from the
perspective of a long-term acquiror, the Genesco Court found that specific short-term
objectives were material to the parties that shortened the length of time in which a
MAC could occur. It is clear that in future cases, the interpretation of MAC
provisions in Tennessee will depend both on the intention of the parties and the
carve-out provisions negotiated in the merger agreement.
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